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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the Ameri-
can Bar Association's 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Model Code's structure was unique. There were nine axiomatic
Canons, and, under each Canon, there were aspirational Ethical Con-
siderations and mandatory Disciplinary Rules. In 1983, the ABA rec-
ommended states abandon its old Model Code and adopt its new Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. There were important policy, concep-
tual, and linguistic changes in the new Model Rules. In 2002, the ABA
revised the 1983 version of the Model Rules, and it now recommends
states adopt these revisions to the Model Rules. Nebraska has kept
the old Model Code.
There are many reasons why Nebraska ought to adopt the revised
Model Rules. First, the ABA has carefully drafted the rules. They are
the product of serious thought, investigation, comment, and delibera-
tion. Nebraska, alone, could never duplicate this effort. Since there is




nothing unique about Nebraska lawyering, Nebraska should defer to
the ABA unless it has a well-considered reason for not doing so. Sec-
ond, lawyers, including Nebraska lawyers, practice nationally. In to-
day's world, geographic and political boundaries are increasingly
unimportant. It makes sense that all American lawyers have the
same ethical standards regardless of where they practice. There
ought to be a common law for lawyers. Third, Nebraska lawyers need
guidance in resolving important ethical and professional dilemmas.
Nebraska is a small state, and it does not generate much judicial or
advisory committee assistance. Practitioners must look elsewhere for
guidance. Since most states have adopted the Model Rules, these ju-
risdictions will generate a large corpus of interpretive literature to
guide Nebraskans.
Of course, there are responses to these positions. First, not every-
one believes the ABA considered the Model Rules carefully or objec-
tively. These commentators not only disagree with the ABA's
perspective and policies, but they also note the Model Rules reflect
extensive lobbying and compromise. Second, many states that have
adopted the Model Rules have amended certain important Rules.
There has been a "Balkanization," and the goal of a set of uniform
lawyer ethics seems illusory. Third, if the Model Rules were not objec-
tively and deliberately promulgated, or if there is too much variation
among other states, then interpretive guidance from other jurisdic-
tions will be unhelpful to Nebraska practitioners.
Regardless, the most important reason Nebraska should adopt the
revised Model Rules is they provide a conceptual and linguistic vocab-
ulary for ethics dialogue and education. Ethics codes are not merely
regulatory rules. They have little impact on a lawyer's behavior.1
They reflect, rather than construct, professional values and priorities.
True ethics and professional attitudes come before any written codes.
How zealous, for example, an advocate ought to be in a particular case
will be resolved, one way or another, without resort to written ethics
codes. How conflicting interests must be before they are disabling will
also be decided without reference to a written code. Lawyers' trained
intuitions will guide them to answers.
A vibrant ethics dialogue and education are important elements in
the training of these professional intuitions. A written ethics code can
generate and concentrate issues for thoughtful discussion. Discus-
sions will not ramble, and the written code can provide a common con-
ceptual and linguistic vocabulary. Debate and disagreements will be
clear. The revised Model Rules will provide both.
1. Stephen E. Kalish, How to Encourage Lawyers to Be Ethical: Do Not Use the
Ethics Codes As a Basis for Regular Law Decisions, 13 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649
(2000).
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Ethics education begins early in a lawyer's career. Law students
are introduced to professional ethics in mandatory law school courses,
and it is the Model Rules, not Nebraska's version of the Model Code,
that supplies the conceptual vocabulary. All teaching books use the
Model Rules as the base for inquiry. Students are required to take a
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination that focuses on
the Model Rules.
Early in their careers, lawyers develop conceptual and linguistic
tools to help them engage important issues. It is not uncommon to
hear students and lawyers talk about "information protected by Rule
1.6," rather than secrets and confidences. With the adoption of the
revised Model Rules, students and lawyers will soon be debating the
meaning of "informed consent," a word of art borrowed from medical
ethics.
Students and lawyers, even Nebraska lawyers, are unfamiliar with
the Model Code's format. They stumble as they work through un-
taught Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. They
do not grasp the meaning of the unfamiliar concepts and language.
The Model Code's language is therefore not a working part of a Ne-
braska lawyer's conceptual framework. It is difficult to use it in dis-
cussion with others.
Nebraska ought not adopt the revised Model Rules because these
rules better reflect appropriate professional norms. This is a matter
for substantive debate elsewhere. Rather, the Nebraska Supreme
Court ought to adopt the revised Model Rules in order to facilitate Ne-
braska lawyers' involvement in the national educational discussion. If
the Nebraska Supreme Court insists on keeping its archaic version of
the Model Code, Nebraskans will be left out of national ethics dialogue
and education. At the least, they will be disadvantaged in these dis-
cussions because they are not adequately conversant with the common
national vocabulary.
Of course, if Nebraska does adopt the revised Model Rules in order
to provide a common vocabulary, it is important that identical expres-
sions in the Nebraska Model Rules and in other states' versions of the
Model Rules have the same meaning. If the same words are used in
different ways, conversation will be confused and impeded rather than
facilitated. I will discuss one example of a case in which the Nebraska
Supreme Court adopted the Model Rules' common vocabulary but in-
terpreted its language in an uncommon way. The court ventured on
its own to adopt a "bright line" rule to resolve conflicts that arise when
a lawyer or student law clerk leaves one firm to work on her own or
with another firm. I have previously written about the application of
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this rule to student clerks, and I was involved in persuading the court
to adopt Disciplinary Rule 5-109.2
Here, I will examine the "bright line" rule's application to a lawyer
who departs from a law firm and who represents a client against a
former client of the lawyer's old law firm, when the lawyer did not
personally represent the former law firm's client. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court did not follow the prudent course of adopting the rele-
vant Model Rule in its entirety. It first articulated a "bright line" rule
in a judicial opinion. It then reiterated the rule in Disciplinary Rule 5-
108(B), using the common vocabulary of the Model Rules. It then in-
terpreted the common language in its own way. Why was the common
language used? Why the different interpretation? What was the
court trying to do? What policy was it trying to advance? Were its
goals similar to the ABA's goals? None of this is clear.
II. THE ISSUE
Whether a lawyer can represent a client against her firm's former
client, even if she were not personally involved with the former client's
matter, is a complicated conflict of interests issue. This problem is
compounded if the lawyer migrated from her former law firm to a new
law firm, and the question is whether her new colleagues can re-
present the new client. This imputed disqualification problem is not
discussed in this Paper.
Litigants, premising their arguments on the existence of improper
conflicts, have frequently moved to disqualify opposing counsel.
Sometimes there are genuine issues of concern; other times the mo-
tions are strategic ploys. Satellite litigation, focusing on these issues,
can take extraordinary amounts of time and resources.
As one would expect, judges and commentators have examined a
number of interests and significant policies in resolving the problems
in particular cases. Most agree, however, that the most important fac-
tors to consider are (1) the former client's interest in assuring that
protected information not be used to its disadvantage versus, (2) a de-
parting lawyer's interest in job mobility, and (3) the new client's pre-
rogative to choose a lawyer.
Model Rule 1.9(b), to which the revised Model Rule 1.9(b) is identi-
cal in relevant parts, provides:
2. Stephen E. Kalish, The Side-Switching Staff Person in a Law Firm: Uncompli-
mentary Assumptions and an Ethics Curtain, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 35 (1991); Har-
vey S. Perlman & Stephen E. Kalish, Has the Supreme Court Modified the Bright
Line Rule?, NEB. LAW., May 1997, at 16; Harvey S. Perlman & Stephen E. Kalish,
How Lawyers Can Help Student Clerks Avoid Disqualification, NEB. LAW., Mar.
1998, at 8.
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A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substan-
tially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was asso-
ciated had previously represented a client,
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client consents
after consultation.
Assuming the interests of the new client are materially adverse to
the former client, and assuming the former client does not consent,
the Model Rule provides a sensible and natural two-step process. The
first important question (I will not examine the meaning of "same
matter") is whether the former firm's client's matter and the lawyer's
new client's matter are "substantially related." It calls for a focus on
the two matters in an objective way. In this step, there is no inquiry
into what the lawyer actually learned about her former firm's client's
case. Rather, the inquiry is more objective. Is there a substantial risk
that an ordinary lawyer, working on the former client's matter, might
have acquired protected information relevant to the new client's mat-
ter? If so, courts will conclude the two matters are substantially re-
lated.3 Without more, the lawyer would be disqualified from
3. The comments to the Rule do not directly address this. Comment 3 to revised
Model Rule 1.9 does. It provides:
Matters are "substantially related" for purposes of this Rule if they in-
volve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a sub-
stantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally
have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance
the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who
has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private finan-
cial information about that person may not then represent that person's
spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously rep-
resented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping
center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to op-
pose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considera-
tions; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of
substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shop-
ping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information
that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the
former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired
in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the pas-
sage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining
whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an
organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and prac-
tices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the
other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation
that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such
a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confiden-
tial information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial
risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subse-
quent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information
may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former
client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a
lawyer providing such services.
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representing the new client. The former client's information would be
protected. It need not worry about what the lawyer might know. In-
deed, if the Rule were otherwise, the former client would have to dis-
close protected information in order to disqualify the lawyer who
might have acquired this protected information.
The Model Rule, however, insists that other important interests be
taken into account. The lawyer is only presumptively disqualified. In
the second step, the Model Rule refocuses, and it permits the lawyer to
establish that she, in fact, did not acquire any protected information.
If the lawyer can establish this, then the lawyer's interests in mobility
and the new client's prerogative to choose a lawyer are promoted. If
the lawyer can establish that she '%ad [not] acquired information pro-
tected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter," then she
can represent the new client.
From the above, it is apparent the two steps assure that all impor-
tant interests are taken into account. The first step, whether the two
matters are substantially related, is an objective comparison of two
situations, without a focus on the particular lawyer's acquired knowl-
edge. It is a prophylactic test designed to assure the former client that
its information will be protected in marginal cases.
This objective analysis of the meaning of substantially related mat-
ters makes linguistic sense. Normally, we would say that two matters
are, or are not, substantially related. The answer would not differ be-
cause one participant in the situation knew something in one case and
not in another. For example, suppose Driver had been in an accident
and had injured Victim 1, Victim 2, and Victim 3. Lawyer A and Law-
yer B were associated with the law firm that represented Driver in
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2002) (emphasis added). Moreo-
ver, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers also addresses this
issue. It provides:
The substantial-relationship test avoids requiring disclosure of confiden-
tial information by focusing upon the general features of the matters in-
volved and inferences as to the likelihood that confidences were imparted
by the former client that could be used to adverse effect in the subsequent
representation. The inquiry into the issues involved in the prior repre-
sentation should be as specific as possible without thereby revealing the
confidential client information itself or confidential information concern-
ing the second client. When the prior matter involved litigation, it will be
conclusively presumed that the lawyer obtained confidential information
about the issues involved in the litigation. When the prior matter did not
involve litigation, its scope is assessed by reference to the work that the
lawyer undertook and the array of information that a lawyer ordinarily
would have obtained to carry out that work. The information obtained by
the lawyer might also be proved by inferences from redacted documents,
for example. On the use of in camera procedures to disclose confidential
material to the tribunal but not to an opposing party, see § 86, Comment
f.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GovERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. d(iii) (2000)
(emphasis added).
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Victim l's case, but neither A nor B personally worked on the matter.
Lawyer A now represents Victim 2 against Driver. Lawyer B repre-
sents Victim 3 against Driver. On the one hand, if Lawyer A learned
prohibited information, she may be disqualified for policy reasons. On
the other hand, if Lawyer B can establish she learned nothing about
Driver's matter, she might not be disqualified for policy reasons. It
would be a strange use of language, however, to conclude the Driver 1
and Driver 2 matters were substantially related, but the Driver 1 and
Driver 3 matters were not. It was, after all, the same accident, the
same defendant, the same facts, and the same legal issues.
III. THE NEBRASKA RULE
The Nebraska Supreme Court fashioned its own substantive rule,
using the ABA's Model Rules' concepts and language. How did this
happen?4 In 1993, the Nebraska Supreme Court was apparently frus-
trated with the satellite litigation related to disqualification motions.
In State ex rel. FirsTier Bank v. Buckley,5 in order
[t]o avoid the necessity of agonizing over this type of decision, to aid the bar in
its coping with situations such as this, to properly preserve not only the actual
existence, but also the appearance, of propriety, and to eliminate as nearly as
possible unnecessary and unwarranted criticism of the legal profession,
6
the court adopted a "bright line" rule. 7 It said,
We now hold that an attorney must avoid the present representation of a
cause against a client of a law firm with which he or she was formerly associ-
ated, and which cause involves a subject matter which is the same as or sub-
stantially related to that handled by the former firm while the present
attorney was associated with that firm.8
The court's stated ground for the rule was, inter alia, "to avoid the
necessity of Uudicial] agonizing over this type of decision." Given the
complexity of law practice and the importance of the interests at
stake, it is difficult to imagine how the court could avoid such agoniz-
ing. Still, it tried.
As a conceptual and linguistic matter, the Nebraska Supreme
Court borrowed the Model Rules' "substantially related matter" vocab-
ulary. But the Nebraska rule had only one step. If two matters were
substantially related, regardless of what the lawyer did or did not
4. See Brian C. Buescher, Note, Out with the Code and in with the Rules: The Disas-
trous Nebraska "Bright Line" Rule for Conflict of Interest: A Direct Consequence of
the Shortcomings in the Model Code, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 717 (1999); Polly
M. Faltin, Note, "Agonizing" over Disqualification Decisions: Fractionalizing the
Nebraska "Bright Line" Rule in State ex rel. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kortum, 31
CREIGHTON L. REV. 279 (1997).
5. 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838 (1993).





know, then the lawyer was disqualified. The court apparently decided
to protect the former client's information in all situations where there
was a genuine threat that the lawyer might have acquired informa-
tion. The former client's interest would not be weighed against the
lawyer's interest in mobility and the new client's prerogative to choose
a lawyer. The departing lawyer would not have an opportunity to es-
tablish that she acquired no protected information at her former firm.
As a policy matter, this is certainly a defensible position.
Of course, many disagreed with the court's single-step approach.
The Nebraska Bar Association petitioned the court for a change-to
adopt a two-step rule, modeled on the Model Rule.9 The court rejected
the proposed rule. It instead adopted Disciplinary Rule 5-108(B):
When a former client is represented by a lawyer's firm but not personally by
the lawyer and the lawyer leaves the firm, the lawyer shall not represent a
client whose interests are materially adverse to the former client in the same
or a substantially related matter in which the firm with which the lawyer
formerly was associated had previously represented the former client, unless
the former client consents after consultation. 10
At this point, Nebraska lawyers were ready to engage in the na-
tional discussion. There was a common definition of "substantially re-
lated matter." There was a uniform method of objective analysis.
Nebraska may have resolved the policy issues differently than did the
ABA, but since the objective analysis was similar and the expression
had the same meaning, Nebraskans could debate the ethics issues
without confusion. Nebraskans could argue that its objective test
properly assured the former client that its protected information
would not be misused. The former client's interest always trumped
the lawyer's interest in mobility and the new client's prerogative to
choose a lawyer.
9. Proposed DR 5-108(B) provided:
(B) When a former client is represented by a lawyer's firm but not per-
sonally by the lawyer and the lawyer leaves the firm, the following rule
shall apply: The lawyer shall not knowingly represent a current client in
the same or a substantially related matter in which the firm with which
the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented the for-
mer client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to the current client, and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired confidential information that is
material to the matter, unless the former client consents after consulta-
tion. The lawyer shall be considered to have acquired confidential infor-
mation that is material to the matter unless the lawyer demonstrates
otherwise.
Brief for Petitioner at 1, app. A at 1-4, In re Neb. State Bar Ass'n, Petition for
Adoption of Additional Disciplinary Rules to Code of Professional Responsibility,
No. S-36-950001 (Neb. 1996), quoted in Faltin, supra note 4, at 322 n.355.
10. NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-108(B) (1997).
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In 1997, in State ex rel. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kortum," the
court had what should have been an easy case to analyze.12 Lawyer
Smith, while at the former firm, had represented Wal-Mart in the Pot-
torff matter, a case involving a slip-and-fall on a slick floor. Later,
after Wal-Mart had dismissed his law firm, one of Smith's colleague's
sought to represent a new client, Kortum, against Wal-Mart in a case
involving a slip-and-fall in a parking lot. Were the two matters sub-
stantially related?13
If there ever were a case in which only an objective analysis of this
issue was appropriate, this was it. Smith had worked on the former
client's matter. If the two matters were such that there was a genuine
risk that a normal lawyer representing Wal-Mart might have learned
protected information, then the two matters would be substantially
related, and Smith would be disqualified. In situations where the de-
parting lawyer worked on the former client's matter, rather than
merely being affiliated with the former firm, it is difficult to imagine
how a former client would ever feel confident that its protected infor-
mation would not be misused. This would be true regardless of the
evidence the lawyer presented to establish that she had learned no
relevant information. Model Rule 1.9(a), and apparently Disciplinary
Rule 5-108(A), adopt this irrebutable presumption. If the two matters
are substantially related, there is no second step. The departing law-
yer may not establish that she knew nothing of the former client's
matter.
With that said, how did the Nebraska Supreme Court define "sub-
stantially related"? It began by articulating the objective analysis.
11. 251 Neb. 805, 559 N.W.2d 496 (1997).
12. Faltin, supra note 4, was particularly suggestive of the analysis provided here.
13. Kortum is different in two ways from the situation we are discussing here. First,
Smith had not left his former firm, and it was Smith's colleague who sought to
represent the new client. This raises the imputed disqualification issue, but,
since Nebraska has taken the inflexible position that if a lawyer is subject to
disqualification, then all her current colleagues are also subject to disqualifica-
tion, the case can be considered as if Smith were representing the new client.
Second, Smith actually represented the former client. In such a case, Nebraska
Code DR 5-108(A) is relevant, and, as Model Rule 1.9(a) does in these situations,
it provides for a one-step test. NEB. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
108(A) (1997), provides:
A lawyer who has personally represented a former client in a matter
shall not thereafter represent a current client in the same or a substan-
tially related matter in which the current client's interests are materi-
ally adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
consents after consultation.
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2002) provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially re-
lated matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to




The subject matters of two causes are substantially related "if the sim-
ilarity of the factual and legal issues creates a genuine threat that the
affected attorney may have received confidential information in the
first cause that could be used against the former client in the present
cause."'4 Moreover, consistent with this objective approach, it noted
the "appearance of impropriety" and screening procedures, such as
"Chinese Walls," were irrelevant. These factors might impact the fi-
nal result, but they were not relevant to the definition of substantially
related matters.
At this point, the court veered off track. It noted, "[iun fashioning a
'substantially related subject matter' test, a court must balance sev-
eral competing considerations."15 This, of course, is exactly what the
second step of Model Rule 1.9(b) would have required in an appropri-
ate case. In Kortum, the Nebraska Supreme Court seemed to reject its
two-step, objective approach. Instead, it conflated the two steps into
one under the rubric of determining the meaning of substantially re-
lated matters. The court narrowly focused on whether Smith himself
had actually acquired protected information. Furthermore, the court
noted that lawyers and judges should consider, inter alia, the follow-
ing factors that focus on whether the actual departing lawyer, not a
any lawyer in those circumstances, had acquired protected informa-
tion: (1) whether the lawyer had interviewed a witness who was a key
witness in both causes; (2) the lawyer's knowledge of the former cli-
ent's trial strategies, negotiation strategies, legal theories, business
practices, and trade secrets; (3) the duration and intimacy of the law-
yer's relationship with the clients; and (4) the functions being per-
formed by the lawyer.16
14. Kortum, 251 Neb. at 811, 559 N.W.2d at 501 (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. The court stated:
In fashioning a 'substantially related subject matter' test, a court
must balance several competing considerations, including the privacy of
the attorney-client relationship, the prerogative of a party to choose
counsel, and the hardships that disqualification imposes on parties and
the entire judicial process. ...
Mindful of these competing interests, we determine that the subject
matters of two causes are 'substantially related' if the similarity of the
factual and legal issues creates a genuine threat that the affected attor-
ney may have received confidential information in the first cause that
could be used against the former client in the present cause. Simply
stated, if the court determines that the unique factual and legal issues
presented in both cases are so similar that there exists a genuine threat
that confidential information may have been revealed in the previous
case that could be used against the former client in the instant case,
then disqualification must ensue.
A nonexhaustive list of the factors a court may consider in making
this determination includes: whether the liability issues presented are
similar; whether any scientific issues presented are similar; whether the
nature of the evidence is similar; whether the lawyer had interviewed a
1360 [Vol. 81:1351
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The court concluded that Smith had established he had not ac-
quired protected information; therefore, the two matters were not sub-
stantially related. And therefore, Smith's colleague, and Smith too if
he had been representing the new client, would not be disqualified.
Without admitting it, the court had grafted Model Rule 1.9(b)'s second
step into its own one-step rule. 17 The Nebraska interpretation of sub-
stantially related matters now included a focus on what information
the lawyer had actually acquired.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Paper, I am not evaluating the substantive policy behind a
one-step DR 5-108(B) or the two-step Model Rule 1.9(b). Instead, I am
critical of the Nebraska Supreme Court's uncommon analysis and in-
terpretation of the Model Rules' common vocabulary. In most jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the Model Rules, two matters are
substantially related if there is a substantial risk that any lawyer rep-
resenting the former client might have acquired protected informa-
witness who was a key in both causes; the lawyer's knowledge of the
former client's trial strategies, negotiation strategies, legal theories, bus-
iness practices, and trade secrets; the lapse of time between causes; the
duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the clients; the
functions being performed by the lawyer; the likelihood that actual con-
flict will arise; and the likely prejudice to the client if conflict does arise.
Id. at 811-12, 559 N.W.2d at 501 (citations omitted).
17. The court stated:
The differences in the factual and legal issues, where a plaintiff falls into
a hole in a parking lot as opposed to where a plaintiff falls on a wet floor
inside a store, are crucial and are not outweighed by the similarities.
We agree with the special master's findings that during the time
Wal-Mart was represented by Smith, the policies, procedures, and prac-
tices Smith was told about did not include any trade secrets or anything
that was not discoverable. Courts have recognized that defense strate-
gies are confidential information that may be factored into the disqualifi-
cation decision. However, the defense strategies utilized in these types
of relatively uncomplicated slip-and-fall actions are generally common-
place and routine. Wal-Mart did not assert that Van Steenberg became
privy to any defense strategies that are unique, unexpected, unusual, or
novel. Thus, we determine that an outside firm, with no prior associa-
tion with Wal-Mart, would have the same or similar practical knowledge
of how Wal-Mart would defend against this action and would have the
same discovery opportunities.
Because Van Steenberg did not acquire any specialized knowledge of
defense strategies or any other discovery advantages, we conclude that
the similarity of the factual and legal issues does not create a genuine
threat that Van Steenberg may have received confidential information
from Wal-Mart that could be used against Wal-Mart in the instant case.
Because Wal-Mart failed to meet its burden of clearly showing that it
has a legal right to the relief sought, we determine that the district court
had no alternative but to deny Wal-Mart's motion to disqualify Van
Steenberg.
Id. at 813-14, 559 N.W.2d at 502-03 (citations omitted).
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tion. The question of whether a lawyer who did not personally
represent the former client acquired such information is left to the
second step. In Nebraska, both issues are conflated under one rubric.
In deciding if two matters are substantially related in one breath, a
person must decide if there is a genuine threat that a lawyer whose
firm had represented the former client might have acquired protected
information and if the lawyer representing the second client had, in
fact, acquired such protected information.
By developing its own approach to the Model Rules' conceptual and
linguistic vocabulary, the Nebraska Supreme Court has impaired the
ability of Nebraska students, lawyers, and judges to engage in the na-
tional ethics dialogue and education. They will always have to explain
the Nebraska interpretation of what should be a common vocabulary,
in this case the meaning of substantially related matters, before they
join the discussion. This will be confusing and, often, misleading. If
the Nebraska Supreme Court had simply adopted the Model Rules, or,
at the least, if it had simply used the common vocabulary without pro-
viding, sub silentio, its own interpretation, then, despite any policy
disagreements, Nebraska students and lawyers would have the vocab-
ulary for ethics dialogue and education.
1362 [Vol. 81:1351
